Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 21
Number 1 Fall 1993

Article 1

1-1-1993

The University in the Manner of Tiananmen
Square
William Van Alstyne

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
William Van Alstyne, The University in the Manner of Tiananmen Square, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1 (1993).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol21/iss1/1

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

ESSAY
The University in the Manner of
Tiananmen Square
By WILLAM VAN ALSTYNE*
The university academic council assembled in the room where it
customarily met. The agenda had been distributed well in advance.
Alternative formulations of a new university offensive verbal conduct
rule was under consideration this afternoon. The council would finally decide the appropriate standard to submit to the Board of Trustees. These were the choices to be discussed and voted on today:
RuLE I. No member of the faculty, student body, or staff
shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders the environment
on campus, or some part thereof, offensive.1
IST ALTERNArVE RuLE I. No member of the faculty, student body, or staff shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders
the environment on campus, or some part thereof,offensive. This
rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual
nature, and not otherwise.
2ND ALTERNATIVE RuLE I. No member of the faculty, student body, or staff shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders
the environment on campus, or some part thereof,offensive. This
rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual
or religious nature, and not otherwise.
3RD ALTERNATivE RLE I. No member of the faculty, student body, or staff shallengage in any verbal conduct that renders
the environment on campus, or some part thereof,offensive. This
rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual,
religious,or racialnature, and not otherwise.
*

William R. and Thomas C. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. [With

thanks to Daniel Defoe, for his useful original essay, The Shortest Way With the Dissenters:
Or Proposalsfor the Establishment of the Church (London, 1703); and also to Catherine
MacKinnon, Richard Delgado, Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, Thomas Grey, and Cass
Sunstein for their highly instructive views.]
1. See also RuLE II ("Any member of the university community who engages in any
verbal conduct contrary to Rule I shall be subject to suspension, dismissal, or other appropriate sanction as the Committee on Offensive Verbal Conduct shall decide.").
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4Tr ALTERNATIVE RULE I. No member of the faculty, stu-

dent body, or staff shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders
the environment on campus, or some part thereof,offensive. This
rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual,
religious, racial, or other nature reflecting an improper and unreasonable attitude toward others accordingto the common standard of the university community, and not otherwise.
A Short History of How the University Came to Adopt the
4th Alternative to. Rule I
!.

The rule first proposed for approval and vote was the rule simply
forbidding offensive speech. This, of course, was the essential idea of
RULE I. The general purpose of the rule was simply to make the campus a more pleasant environment for those participating in the university, to create a hospitable environment in which to carry on workwhether as students, faculty, administration and staff, or as regular
and valued employees.
But this original, broadly-framed proposal was quickly dismissed
as, at best, well-intended but nevertheless poorly conceived. The idea
was too sweeping. Could complaints be brought and charges pursued
before a committee empowered to put anyone at risk insofar as the
committee were satisfied, after investigation and hearing, that one's
"verbal conduct" did-in some fashion-seriously offend others (and
so, as to them, render the environment, or some part thereof, offensive)? Surely, offensiveness per se could not be an appropriate test.
This was vastly too broad and altogether too chilling for anyone's
taste. It reached all "verbal conduct" rendering "the environment" on
campus, or any part of the campus, "offensive." But what would that
mean? An "offensive environment," it was asked, for example, to
whom? To students attending a particular class? To others, not in
that class, who learned what was said by a faculty member or other
students? Not offensive to students (or not only to students), but offensive to other faculty, to trustees, to alumni on campus, to administrators, or to staff? "Offensive," moreover, in what way? Merely in
one's choice of particular terms? 2 In the very nature of the information imparted?3 Or, rather, the conclusions summarized or offered as
opinion, in or out of class? Or "offensive" merely in the apparent
2. E.g., graphic, rather than euphemistic, usages or depictions?
3. Information, for instance, some might deem inappropriate to present (due to its
offensive implications), like tabulations of SAT scores by race, or tabulations of HIV infection rate variations correlated by specific sex practices of various groups?
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callousness of one's values as such-values affronting the values of
others on campus, or on some part of the campus where they worked?
The entire notion of proceeding in this way was hopeless. The
implicit censorship of the proposal, and the standard it employed,
were too much like the chilling fatwa issued worldwide on Salman
Rushdie for having authored his religiously offensive (blasphemous)
work of fiction, Ti SATANIC VERsEs-a work condemned and an
author sentenced to death for his offensive (mis)portrayal of the life
of the Prophet. No member of-the council was willing to accept any
rule cast in terms so loose as to lend themselves to levelling the campus in any of these ways. The proposal as projected in RULE I was
quickly tabled. The council turned at once to the first alternative proposal, hoping it would avoid .most-perhaps all-of the problems
compelling the council's decision not to recommend the original version of RULE I.
U.

Initially, !sALTERNATzVE RULE I looked considerably more
promising because it was so much more specific and narrow. It had
come to the council as a concrete proposal from a special task force on
sexual harassment. It had particular podint because of the still recent
(and disturbing) Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings that nearly all
had seen on network broadcasts. And it was given particular point,
too, by the council's own understanding that some rule roughly of this
sort was expected of the university under federal law. Titles VI and
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and Title IX of the
Educational Amendments Act of 1972, evidently required all institutions receiving any federal assistance to forbid sexual harassment.
The proposal was designed specifically to meet that requirement, and
in doing so it tried not to go beyond that specific concern. In contrast
with RULE I, it was thus deliberately very limited; it would reach only
offensive verbal conduct "of a sexual nature," and it took exact care
4
so to say.
In the course of discussion, however, the council came to understand that 1ST ALTEArATIVE RULE I would put the university in a
4. sTrALTERNATIvERuLE I: "No member of the faculty, student body, or staff shall
engage in any verbal conduct that renders the environment on campus, or some part
thereof, offensive. This rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual
nature, and not otherwise." (Note the comportment of this draft to the E.E.O.C. requirement, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1992), directing employers to "take all steps necessary," including "developing appropriate sanctions," to eliminate "verbal conduct of a sexual nature
[having] the purpose or effect of creating an... offensive working environment.").
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most awkward position-for what the rule left out. While the rule
was initially well-received (it was taken for granted that it was meant
principally to protect women on campus from being subjected to humiliating remarks, denigrative jokes, etc.), as now drafted it left out of
account religiously denigrative or humiliating verbal conduct of a like
sort (e.g., "jokes" about Jews). Evidently, these would not be treated
in the same fashion as abusive verbal descriptions of women (or of
men). Was this really to be so? It required but little discussion for the
council to concede that the failure to include verbal conduct of a religiously aspersive nature was a mistake insofar as 1sr ALTERNATIVE
RULE I treated the humiliation of others by religion as of unequal
concern (indeed, by its terms, of NO concern) as humiliation by sex.
So to avoid that impression the council moved to 2ND ALTRNATIVE
RULE I.5
iM.

But the discussion about abusive or offensive "verbal conduct of
a sexual or religious nature," now subject to the proposed rule, only
made the council more sharply aware that the same point made as to
religion applied with at least equal force to verbal conduct of a racially-aspersive (and offensive) nature as well. And how was one to
feel about that? Was it to be true that offensive utterances (i.e.,
denigrative utterances) would be subject to complaint only if insulting
toward others based on gender or religion? Was racialdisparagement
truly to be treated as less inappropriate on campus, or less subject to
sanction (indeed, subject to no sanction at all)? How was that possible? The very idea was startling. Something was clearly wrong.
Several council members suggested that this must be a red herring. Though the new rule would, by its terms, reach only verbal conduct of a "sexual nature" (now amended to include religious
disparagement), and only then insofar as it rendered the campus environment (or some part thereof) "offensive", and though the new rule
admittedly did not apply to "racist" verbal conduct, it was false to
claim that such behavior was somehow thereby in any way meant to
5. 2ND ALTERNArivE RuLE I: "No member of the faculty, student body, or staff
shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders the environment on campus, or some part
thereof, offensive. This rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual
or religious nature, and not otherwise." (The council was well advised to make this adjustment in the proposed rule; a footnote accompanying the E.E.O.C. directive to employers,
see supra note 4, declares that the "same principle" requiring them to take action against
"verbal conduct of a sexual nature [having] the purpose or effect of creating an... offensive working environment" applies identically in respect to such conduct of a religious
nature as well (and so, too, as to race). See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11, n.1 (1992)).
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be condoned. Presumably-this in answer to a sharp question-it was
already subject to discipline by some other rule. If not (and the
speaker conceded that there seemed to be no such specific rule), then
assuredly it should be added, and added quickly, as it easily could be.
Several thought this surely must be right. In response to the first
point, however, there seemed to be no pre-existing, adequate rule the
previous speakers could point to. Moreover, whatever might have
been thought in the past, it provided no reason to leave out offensive
racial verbal conduct from the proposed rule, insofar as the council
itself was now about the specific business of recommending what was
to be the proper regulation of unacceptable offensive verbal conduct
at the university. Additionally, as a member of the council observed-and this point seemed especially strong-in having already
extended the rule to make clear that offensive verbal conduct of a
religious nature was to be covered, to fail to include the same treatment of race could rightly be regarded as a callous inversion of priorities-an act of willful discrimination by the council itself. The point
hung in the air, awaiting a satisfactory response.
iv.

But before the council even moved to a vote on 3RD ALTERNA(as, by now, many had already been persuaded to do),
the discussion had become increasingly awkward for others in the
council. Prompted by the unexpected turn the more general discussion was taking, they had begun thinking of still other issues, and
other analogies. By leaving out verbal conduct denigrating to others
(and making the campus environment oppressive to them) by yet
other, indistinguishable kinds of belittling depictions, remarks, jokes,
or posters-because of physical characteristics ("cripples"?), sexual
orientation ("faggots"?), or national origin ("the yellow peril"?), for
instance,-indeed, by cordoning off only such verbal conduct as reflecting offensively on some characteristics but not others (age, sexual
orientation, national origin, veteran status, obesity?), the rule was discriminatory in the bias of its restricted coverage: denying all others
any standing to complain, and dismissing any complaint they might
have as evidently of no equal worth-notwithstanding that this
"speech" (this "verbal conduct") was belittling to them, notwithstanding that it reduced them to stereotype, and notwithstanding that it
TiVE RULE 16

6. 3RD ALTER ATIVE RULE I: "No member of the faculty, student body, or staff
shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders the environment on campus, or some part
thereof, offensive. This rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual,
religious, or racial nature, and not otherwise."
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subjected them to an offensive environment on campus or some part
thereof. So what was the principle the rule sought to capture, after
all? What did the council think it-the council itself-was actually
about? How should the council frame a suitable rule neither overinelusive nor underinclusive of what "verbal conduct" was appropriate
to forbid?
More members of the council stirred uneasily in their seats. The
university surely must, they had thought, work in the best way it could
to assert a clear substantive stance on the right way of thinking about
gender, religion; and race. In large part, that very supposition was
itself built into the rule. In large part, moreover, many understood
this to be part of the very function of the university (was it not?)-to
educate their students, their employees, and themselves on just such
questions? Moreover, as already noticed, in some measure that position was obvious from the formulation of the rule the council already
had previously (albeit tentatively) approved. And, whether or not all
agreed that that was so-about the proper mission of the universityat a minimum it was already virtually settled by the council as being so
to the extent that it would forbid "offensive" verbal conduct respecting characteristics of gender, religion, or race, so to ban these abusive
and hurtful acts from prejudicing the environment. So much had already virtually been agreed to, had it not?
But was it true that the university had no equally determinable
position on the "right" way of thinking, or expressing one's views,
about other characteristics or differences? For example, about sexual
orientation, or about age, or about national origin, or about economic
class? But if not, then why, not? How did it distinguish what it was
prepared to do from what it was not prepared to do? In other words,
on what basis would it be a mere Pontius Pilate7 on these other things,
when it was agreed on the things already proposed for the rule? In
the face of baneful remarks belittling others for their sexual orientation, whether made to them or of them,8 for example, would the university nonetheless refuse to consider the matter as of the same
complainable sort as when baneful remarks of a religiously or racially
aspersive sort were the object of complaint? Why should that be?
7. I.e., refusing to pass judgment.
8. Under the rule as it stood, it was the "environment" that mattered. It was not
crucial that sexually demeaning expressions need be personally directed to a particular
individual, for example, for certainly the display of sexually demeaning posters of women
"as such" were meant to be reached under the rule as it now stood-and so, too, of course,
in equivalent circumstances regarding race or religion as well.
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And how would one account for the university's stance? What was its
principle?
And, again, why was it necessary? The council had resolved that
it would not leave some "verbal conduct" to the inadequate response
of a mere "free speech" campus. So much as this was already settled
and clear. If the university would no longer leave some to the mercy
of the "free speech campus," but would so leave others, it needed to
explain its principle "up front." It necessarily followed that the
proper concern of the council, and the right object of the right kind of
rule, was to explain its principle up front, to identify the metric of the
rule and explain why certain offensive statements were forbidden and
others not, to give a foundation-not a mere institutional ipse dixitadequately distinguishing what offensive statements were forbidden
from those statements not forbidden, regardless of their offensiveness,
to distinguish mere bigotry (if that were the point of distinction) from
what, though offensive, had value of some sort, on which account it
would not be made the object of this rule. (though it seemed to reflect
other attitudes one might equally resent, equally feel offended by,
equally believe to be wrong or demoralizing), as many might believe
to be true of Salman Rushdie's THE SATANIC VERsES-which no university would, or ought to be, prepared to forbid. Until that task was
done, moreover, no useful, principled rule could be adopted adequately distinguishing verbal conduct that would not be appropriate to
forbid from that which the university would not tolerate or condone.
V.
The challenge laid down seemed to be worthy and fair to the
council. In the course of the afternoon, it struggled at length to meet
this challenge as best it could. In the end, however, the council could
do no better than to adopt 4THALTERNATIvERULE 1. 9 For even after
elaborate further efforts to be more specific, it was agreed that nothing significantly more instructive or more specific could be done. The
council's own discussion served principally to make clear what perhaps should have been obvious all along-that there was really no
principle the council could state beyond "the principle" announced on
9. 4TiH ALTERNATVE RuLE I: "No member of the faculty, student body, or staff
shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders the environment of the campus, or some
part thereof, offensive. This rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a
sexual, religious, racial, or other nature reflecting an improper and unreasonable attitude
toward others according to the common standard of the university community, and not
otherwise."
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the face of 4TH ALTERNATIVE RULE I, and, in fact, it did quite accurately reflect the operative standard after all else was said and done.
Predictably, as all agreed, not all "denigrative" or all "negative"
depictions were uniformly thought appropriate to forbid. Even if expressed emphatically, they might be correct or, if not perfectly correct,
at least "understandable," and thus not condemnable as offensive
"mere bigotry" as such. Necessarily, that is, some offensive speech
(i.e., speech offensive to some persons because, in their view, denigrating of them) was not to be forbidden, consistent with the council's
rejection of original RULE I. A proper rule had to allow for this understanding. And 4TH ALTERNATVE RULE I did so, articulating the
differentiating principle as crisply as circumstances would allow. A
substantial number of council members shared the view, for example,
that the European discovery and subsequent displacement of Native
Americans, beginning with Columbus and San Salvador, could be described as "genocide." In keeping with that view, many likewise
thought it not inappropriate-quite understandable, in fact-for Native American students to express themselves very aggressively about
certain subjects, i.e., to speak aggressively about whites-of the
"white man," and of "the white man's rape" of the continent, and "the
white man's racism" as well. Oppositely, however, a denigrative description of Native Americans (as "aborigines," or as "backward peoples" with a "primitive culture") would not pass without notice. And,
moreover, at the least they were quite prepared tor vote for a rule
sanctioning offensive stereotype depictions of Native Americans if concretely carriedinto verbal conduct so to make some part of the campus
an "offensive environment" for Native American students subjected
either directly or indirectly to such affronts. They were confident their
colleagues were willing to do no less. 10
Other members disagreed with this example (they thought it
somewhat ill-chosen and subject to a good deal of uncertainty that
their colleagues hadn't allowed for"1 ), though they admitted that their
10. They suggested, moreover, that under the federal civil rights acts (and the
E.E.O.C. regulation, supra note 4), the university might be in violation of the federal acts
were it not so to act and were it to fail to insure an environment for Native American
employees, students, faculty, or staff, free of such denigrative stereotype depictions in the
very day-to-day places where they would be expected to carry on their work within the
university itself.
11. For them, the example was troublesome partly because of its asymmetry-even as
apparently exhibited in their colleague's own illustration: that it would privilege one offensive kind of group epithet ("white persons" as "racists"?) while not privileging another
(Native American peoples as "backward" or as subject to some other denigrative characterization or some equivalently dismissive stereotype). Did their colleagues mean to sug-
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colleagues' view of its appropriate treatment was not without some
measure of reason, as they felt about several, still different examples
other council members put forth.
As one such example, a member of the council asked whether
pedophilia-apronounced or even exclusive erotic longing for sexual
intimacy with youngsters-was a category of "sexual orientation" the
council believed to be indistinguishable in entitlement to be treated
with equality of protection from verbal abuse on campus according to
the proposed rule? The question went largely unanswered. Several
council members stiffened at the question, suspicious of why such a
matter was even raised, unless as a snide suggestion aimed actually at
them, as gay and lesbian persons (which they were). Was the question
raised to draw them out, either to "defend" their own gay or lesbian
orientation in front of the council, or otherwise to accept the unstated
but implied comparison of themselves with pedophiles?

gest that the one hostile description (e.g., addressing whites as "racists") was less offensive,
or somehow more legitimate (i.e., more warranted?)than the other? On what basis might
they think so (or did they not regard this as genuinely contestable, though not everyone
would be inclined to agree)? Or was it their view, rather, that a properly considered rule
will lay down one kind of verbal conduct standard for certain students, faculty, staff, and
employees, but a different standard for others whose expressions of animus were simply
not to be treated the same way? Possibly. And possibly for a reason. But if so, what kind
of rule is this, and how would one expect it to work? May not such a rule seem itself to say
that some students (minority students?) are regarded not as being more in the right than
others, but merely more pardonable as to their polemical excesses because not really equal
after all (on which account they are not to be held to the same expectations of verbal
behavior toward others on campus as others are expected to maintain toward them)? But
insofar as this were its evident message, would it actually work to support them (as their
colleagues obviously intended), or might it merely further undermine them-in so treating
their offensive depictions of others as something the university expects others to pass off or
ignore? Or were their colleagues suggesting that even if each description may be thought
to be equally off the mark, and equally offensive in stigmatizing terms (e.g., whites as
"racists"), still, given the status of some students on campus, their outbursts (such as they
may be) are far more readily understandable, given the conditions they are unequally
made to confront on campus, and, so, ought not be treated the same way. But how does
this explanation really help at all?
Similarly, in thinking about a different (but related) example, these council members
wondered whether the rule as applied, as their colleagues had it in mind, would likewise
mean to exempt from complaint denigrative speech that complains of, that belittles, or that
dismissively stereotypes "white male European faculty members" and thereby makes the
working environment offensive to them, but not likewise exempt denigrative speech that
belittled or that stereotyped women faculty or "faculty persons of color"? If it declines to
act in the same way in respect to each, however, how will the university explain its policy
and its failure to treat "like complaints" alike? (On the other hand, if it acts with equal
vigor so to reach both kinds of belittling verbal conduct equally, whose interests may
thereby seem in fact to be more substantially served?)
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Unknown to these council members, however, the question was
asked by a faculty member interested in testing the council's principle-an anguished faculty member who himself subscribed to
pedophile magazines and who lived in terrible dread of having his own
orientation discovered. Moreover, he fully believed that the sexual
distinctions drawn by others were themselves merely self-serving. He
had hoped the council would respond not with silence, but positively
to his idea. Inwardly, he was filled with dismay that his question had
been treated as some miscarried, or tasteless, out-of-place remark.
One member of the council hesitantly suggested that whether
such an orientation would be protected by the verbal conduct rule
would perhaps depend, at least partly-perhaps entirely-on
"whether the leading national professional psychiatric and psychological organizations still regarded such a person as sexually deviant
rather than normal," in which case, he supposed, descriptions of
pedophiles as "deviates" "needing treatment," could not be described
as expressions of "bigotry," whereas descriptions of gays and lesbians
as "deviates" "needing treatment" would be subject to sanction under
the rule.' 2 But this altogether hapless effort to respond, so to draw
some distinction according to how professional psychiatric and psychological organizations happened to classify such things, served only
to make the matter that much worse.
But by now it was altogether apparent that this entire line of discussion would prove disastrous if allowed to proceed topic by topic,
along any such lines as this. Other members of the council swiftly
drew from this exchange the same conclusion as had already become
quite obvious to others-that the council could not possibly go on in
this way, now to adjudicate what was acceptable for some to say and
what was not insofar as it made the environment offensive to others in
some particular way. And it could not possibly make a definitive list
of essentially forbidden expressions, so to distinguish them from unforbidden expressions, and adequately explain the difference-as it
now was at risk of seeming to do. Neither could it possibly provide a
suitable guideline list framed in any sufficient way to catch all that
should be caught on the one hand (whatever that was), and yet leave
untouched everything else, however offensive, appropriately pro12. He had in mind, of course, that such organizations had altered their views regarding homosexuality some few decades earlier, no longer regarding such an orientation as
abnormal (and thus not a condition one would seek to "treat" as these same organizations
previously held), but they had made no similar transition for pedophilia and a number of
other sexual interests of a still somewhat more exceptional kind.
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tected by an ample academic freedom and an ample campus freedom
of speech.
The thing to be done, therefore, was not to give up, but instead to
stop with such agreement as could be reached now, so to frame the
rule simply, specifically in the terms already proposed in 4TrH ALTERNATrivE RULE I. Beyond this, the council clearly was not the appropriate place to settle anything else. Rather, as actual incidents might
arise, consistent with the standard now framed on the face of the proposed rule itself, the appropriate hearing board could sort them out:
as complaints might be brought, hearings held, decisions made, and
sanctions applied. In brief, the particular application of 4rH ALTERNATIVE RuLE I would be determined under the procedures provided
in RULE H.13
To be sure, this regime might have its own difficulties, but so
much was unavoidable, no matter what the council might do. The assumption should be the practical one that "everyone would know" (or
in any event quickly learn) what the "core" of unacceptable verbal
conduct was to consist of and why. Nor would it be particularly helpful, it was agreed, for the council, having already framed the rule, to
get into "explanations" or provide examples (they might themselves
be insulting and misunderstood, or somehow taken the wrong way by
some). Obviously, some basic sense of the community would inform
the hearing committee; the council was both willing and eager to assume that it would. There was, nearly all agreed, no obvious superior
alternative to meet the objections that had been raised than that proposed by 4THALTERNATIVE RULE I. Operating under this reformulation of RLE I, the proper committee, already provided for under
RULE II, would decide the appropriate disposition of each actual incident, accordingto the metric of the rule itself. And so the council decided to do.
vi.

In the end, the key to the success in the final formulation and
adoption of 4TH ALTERNArVE RULE I was the consensus on basic
principle. Its basic principle was really quite clear, was it not?' 4 And
much unlike original RULE I (which, the council pointed out to its
13. RuLE II: "Any member of the university community who engages in any verbal
conduct contrary to Rule I shall be subject to suspension, dismissal, or other appropriate
sanction as the Committee on Offensive Verbal Conduct shall decide."
14. Assuming one thinks so, how might one"best express it? (And if one thinks it is

somehow lacking in some particular, what different principle might one prefer to put in its
stead?)
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own satisfaction, had been squarely defeated), 4TH ALTERNATIVE
RULE I refused to make offensiveness per se the test. 4THALTERNATivE RULE I was both different from and far better than original
RULE I because it was neither overinclusive nor underinclusive of
properly sanctionable verbal conduct according to its own terms. Unless one's verbal conduct was both offensive and also of a nature reflecting an improper and unreasonable attitude toward others, as the
rule declared, then one's verbal conduct remained outside the reach of
the rule, i.e., it would not be subject to complaint and to sanction.
This struck the council as being exactly as it should be.
As thus amended and perfected, the rule was no longer underinclusive because it would now treat "all like cases alike," so to apply
equally, for instance, whether the object of one's denigration were
some mental characteristic of others (e.g., "retards"), some physical
characteristic ("cripples"), some sexual orientation characteristic
("faggots"), or some other characteristic including (but now no longer
limited to) race, religion, or gender. Rather, expressions of bigoted
animus calculated to diminish the sense of self worth of others on
campus, and to make the environment on campus' s a humiliating or
oppressive place for them, would be reached whether of a sexual nature or some other nature. In that way, the amendment to the rule
represented an obvious gain.
Yet, the rule was not overinclusive, for it was no longer driven by
the same censorship standard of original RULE I. That standard, such
as it was, and now rejected, was that the mere offensive, denigrative,
belittling, or discriminatory character of one's speech (i.e., speech willfully designed to express a harsh or a negative view of others or of
their practices), would, on that account, make it subject to complaint.
But under the new rule, while this characteristic of one's speech was
retained as a necessary condition, it would not be a sufficient condition. Specifically, that one's verbal conduct might express an animus
toward others and be offensive to them, or that it belittled them, their
beliefs, or their attitudes, or their values in some way, would not
render it subject to complaint unless, in addition to being offensive in
the manner or substance of its content (and whether or not it was of a
sexual nature), it also reflected an improper and unreasonableattitude
according to the common standard of the university-and all of this
according to the specific terms of the rule itself.

15. Or some part thereof.
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So, to take a clear instance, applying this branch of the rule, even
"hateful" denigrative expressions about a neo-Nazi student group on
campus would be within the realm of protected expression, insofar as
such expressions of rejection, based on a shared repugnance regarding
neo-Nazis, could not be considered "unreasonable" or "improper" for
a member of the university community to hold as a view, or to reflect
straightforwardly in their speech. That they-the very persons or

group(s) targeted by such speech-may feel themselves humiliated by
such speech, that they may not like the way they are thus depicted, or
that they may believe they are misunderstood, however, is neither
here nor there, for surely one has a right to present one's opinions on
16
neo-Nazis, whether neo-Nazis find themselves offended or not.
Neo-Nazis are properly left to the mercy of the free speech campus, 17
just as others' 8 properly are not. The whole challenge, of course, is to
know how to draw the distinction. The example was, all agreed, an
excellent example in serving so well to illustrate the real value of the
full terms of the rule. 19
16. Indeed, what kind of university would it be that had a rule forbidding one to point
out what one thinks to be the undesirable traits or qualities of persons of this sort
(whatever one thinks persons of "this" sort means)?
17. As also might be true, say, of those whose sexual taste may run to children (i.e.,
pedophiles) and similar deservingly disreputable groups, individuals, or beliefs, the impugning of which could not be said to reflect an "improper and unreasonable attitude"
according to "the common standard" of the university.
18. I.e., all those protected by the proposed rule.
9. That certain verbal conduct offending men on campus (e.g., reiterated descriptions
depicting them as lascivious, to be watched out for as prone to sexual exploitation, to violence, to rape, and to the subordination of women) would likewise not be subject to the
rule, most on the council thought likely as well (unless one were prepared to declare that
such negative depictions, cautions, and warnings (about men) would be held to reflect to
an "unreasonable" and "improper" attitude, which they thought unlikely-for who is prepared so to insist that they do?). That such depictions may be resented by many men, or
rejected as false by at least some men, as well as stigmatizing of them, as well as offensive,
is neither here nor there. For again, this rule avoids making these matters (the alleged felt
falseness of the depiction, the resentment of those depicted, or its offensiveness to some
person or some group) a sufficient ground, as it rightly should. But, in contrast with these
cases, on the other hand, perhaps most (perhaps all) expressions of animus or belittlement
of gay or lesbian persons (though not necessarily of pedophiles), or of women (though not
necessarily of men), or of most racial groups (though not necessarily of whites), when carried into offensive words or graphics on campus, would be subject to complaint and to
definite sanction under RuLE fl-reflecting (as they surely would be held so to reflect) an
"improper" as well as an "unreasonable" attitude according to the metric of the rule. On
all such matters, the rule is fully equal to the demands made upon it according to its own
terms: the rule takes suitable care to identify the proper framework for correct judgment-not the framework of what "outsiders" think, but what "the university" thinks on
each of these matters ("the common standard of the university" is the standard made to
count). What could be more appropriate than this, in framing a speech code for the university, neither overinclusive nor yet underinclusive of university-sanctionable speech?
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Those terms were crafted with care so to provide the most honest
statement of what the rule-or any (i.e., every) rule of just this sortactually represents in the end. The council agreed this was so, and
shortly thereafter likewise agreed it was time to adjourn. First, however, the two salutary rules, 4TH ALTERNATIVE RULE I and RuLE II,
were approved to the accompaniment of two cheers for a better campus environment, for academic freedom, and for the due protection of
an appropriate freedom of speech. And only then did the members of
the council file out from the room in which they had met. °

20. . .. Except for a small lingering group off in one comer-who thought they caught
a slight whiff of diesel fumes, and a slight sound, as of tanks clanking, as in some far away
deserted Square.

